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Introduction 
“We Should Take Nothing for Granted” 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower coined the phrase “military–industrial complex” (MIC) to 
describe the informal alliance between the U.S. military and the DoD contractors who supplies it. 
[1] Within this alliance, hundreds of billions of dollars are spent annually the enable the power of 
the U.S Military, the most dominant fighting force the world has ever seen.  
When President Eisenhower used the phrase “Military Industrial Complex” in his farewell 
speech to the nation on January 17th, 1961, in was in the context of warning: “We should take 
nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of 
the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals so 
that security and liberty may prosper together.” [1] Eisenhower warned that the MIC should not 
become a self-perpetuator of wars creating more need for federal funding, creating more supply 
for waging war. Alternatively, when Eisenhower said, “we should take nothing for granted,” he 
may not have foreseen that one day our nations adversaries would be stealing valuable and 
sensitive military information through computer network connections that span the entire planet. 
Sensitive but Unclassified Information 
The phrase “sensitive but unclassified information” originated in the National Security 
Decision Directive (NSDD 145) signed by President Reagan on September 17th, 1984. The 
directive, titled “National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems 
Security,” had far reaching significance in the world of computer security and was mandated to 
protect both classified and sensitive but unclassified information. The directive gave the NSA 
limited jurisdiction in the private sector. [2] Two years later, on October 29th, 1986, the National 
Telecommunications, and Information Systems Security Publication 2 (NTISSP 2) was published 
in an effort to clarify the meaning of sensitive but unclassified information while providing better 
 4 
 
interpretation of the protection requirements. The publication was titled the “National Policy on 
Protection of Sensitive but Unclassified Information in Federal Government Telecommunications 
and Automated Systems.” NTISSP 2 defined sensitive but unclassified information as “information 
the disclosure, loss, misuses, alteration, or destruction of which could adversely affect national 
security or other federal government interests. National security interests are those unclassified 
matters that relate to the national defense or foreign relations of the U.S. government.” NTISSP 
2 applied to all government agencies and contactors. [2] However, the policy, which was drafted 
by Rear Adm. John M. Poindexter when he was National Security Advisor, was cancelled on 
March 19th, 1987 by Frank C. Carlucci, who succeeded Admiral Poindexter. [3]  
NTISSP 2, essentially the safeguarding of sensitive but unclassified information, was 
cancelled for many reasons, but chief among them because it restricted competitiveness of U.S. 
private industry. The ideology that restricting capability versus safeguarding sensitive but 
unclassified information would survive another 25 years for DoD contractors.  
MIC Federal Budget Impact and Market Scope 
The U.S. became the most dominant force over the decades of the 20th and 21st centuries, 
through world wars, the Cold War, the threat of communism, and the threat of terrorism, by making 
defense spending the largest item in the annual discretionary budget of the Federal Government. 
The discretionary budget in 2016 was $1.15 trillion, and was about 25% of the total federal budget. 
The other 75% of the overall federal budget is the mandatory budget (Medicare, health care, 
social security, or interest on the national debt). [2] In 2016, defense budget was about 54% of 
the discretionary budget, which is about $622 billion. At $622 billion, the U.S. spends more on 
defense than the next seven countries in the world combined.[3] Having the world’s most powerful 
military has long been an esteemed value of most Americans, as exemplified over decades of 
U.S. leadership in the congress and the presidency.  
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The DoD awards approximately $300 billion annually in new contracts, and about 50% of 
the new contracts are awarded to the top 30 DoD contractors. [6] Yet, there were over 33,000 
companies who contracted with the Department of Defense (DoD) in 2015. [6]  
DoD contractors provide the military with items as large as aircraft carriers and as small 
as a small buoy. The MIC is a vast marketplace where the top companies (the medium and large 
DoD contractors) play consistent roles year after year (Lockheed supplies aircraft, Northrop 
Grumman supplies ships, General Dynamics supplies tanks). Small contactors make up 99% of 
the total number of defense contractors.   
MIC Supply Chain Ecosystem and Sensitive but Unclassified 
Information 
The 33,000 contractors who contracted with the DoD provides a reasonable idea of the 
market ecosystem. Certainly, not every DoD contractor stores sensitive but unclassified 
information. But it is highly likely that every contractor supplies to another DoD contractor that 
does. Obviously, the DoD itself stores and processes sensitive but unclassified information. There 
are at least 33,000 companies that store or are one vendor relationship away from an organization 
that stores sensitive but unclassified information.  
During the Christmas season in 2013, the Target data breach showed how a company 
was vulnerable to a cyber-attack through its supply chain. “The attackers backed their way into 
Target's corporate network by compromising a third-party vendor. The number of vendors 
targeted is unknown. However, it only took one. That happened to be Fazio Mechanical, a 
refrigeration contractor.” [8]  
The scope of the MIC supply chain ecosystem offers a vast attack surface for any target 
within the military industrial complex.  
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U.S. Taxpayer Expectations 
U.S. taxpayers should expect that safeguarding sensitive but unclassified information be 
treated as a critical priority and that proportional efforts and expenditures are made by every 
company that is awarded contracts by the Department of Defense. Further, the U.S. Federal 
Government should ensure that a proper safeguarding standard is enforced and audited. Nothing 
should be taken for granted when it comes to cyber security in the MIC. The U.S. taxpayers have 
invested too much, and the U.S. national security is at stake.   
Cyber Security in the Military Industrial Complex 
The system at risk across the MIC can be divided into four areas of focus in terms of cyber 
security strategy: 1) Federal information systems containing data classified as secret or higher, 
2) DoD contractor information systems containing data classified as secret or higher, 3) Federal 
information systems containing unclassified data, and 4) DoD contractor information systems 
containing unclassified data.  
 
Figure 1: Cyber Security in Military Industrial Complex before 12/31/2017 
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The National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual  
Federal information systems and DoD contractor information systems containing classified 
data are managed by mature standards and processes that have been in place for more than two 
decades.  
Executive Order 12829 was signed on January 6th, 1993 to establish “a National Industrial 
Security Program to safeguard Federal Government classified information that is released to 
contractors, licensees, and grantees of the United States Government.” [7] EO 12829 established 
the National Industrial Security Program (NISP), and the National Industrial Security Program 
Operating Manual (NISPOM). [8]  NISP is specifically concerned with managing the needs of 
private industries access to classified information. Classified information requires a security 
clearance by both the individual and the contractor. Chapter 8 of the NISPOM describes the 
requirements and processes for managing information systems that store and process classified 
information. [9]  Chapter 8 sets a high bar for information security. One of the key controls is that 
information systems are not allowed to be connected or routed to the internet in any way. The 
Defense Security Service (DSS) is the agency charged with oversight of the NISP, and they work 
closely with the cleared contractors to ensure that NISPOM security controls are continually 
maintained. When the DSS finds negligence in the cleared contractors implementation of the 
NISPOM, the contractor can lose accreditation, and consequently lose the DoD contract.  Loss of 
a contract due to lack of compliance to the NISPOM is a high risk for cleared contractors, thus 
there is significant time, effort, resources and costs associated with NISPOM compliance.  
The NISPOM is highly effective in protecting secret information and data. The operational 
complexities and costs for stealing classified information are higher for a hacker whose goal is to 
steal classified information versus unclassified information.   The fact that classified information 
cannot be stored on a classified network is prohibited from having routed access to the internet 
(aka classified networks are air gapped from the internet) makes hacking classified networks very 
difficult.  The NISPOM air gap control, in conjunction with the 149 pages of processes and 
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procedures, assures appropriate protection of our DoD co-managed classified information.  Cyber 
risk is thus managed effectively in both federal and DoD contractor information systems that 
contain classified data.  
FISMA and NIST 
In 2002, in response to 9/11 combined with increased concerns for cyber security, 
Congress passed the Federal Information System Management Act (FISMA). FISMA is the 
primary law that tells federal agencies how they must secure their unclassified IT systems. FISMA 
authorizes the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop security 
standards for IT systems that do not contain classified information. [10] NIST developed a Federal 
Information Processing Standard Publication called FIPS 200, which defines minimum security 
requirements.  Then in February of 2005, NIST created Special Publication 800-53 to define 
specific cyber security controls for safeguarding unclassified federal information systems. NIST 
SP 800-53 has been revised 5 times since its introduction, and widely regarded as a benchmark 
standard to assess any organizations information system.  But the federal law only requires that 
federal information systems comply with 800-53. 
DoD Contractors Lacking Cyber Security Safeguarding 
Regulations 
Although DoD contractors are required to comply with FISMA and FIPS 200 in principal, 
they are not required to comply with NIST SP 800-53 [13]. In fact, most defense contractors are 
not currently compelled to comply with any cyber security laws or standards on their unclassified 
networks. As mentioned in the Introduction, the ideology that restricting capability versus 
safeguarding sensitive but unclassified information would survived since the short lived NTISSP-
2 was cancelled in 1987. It would not be until 2013 that safeguarding controls for sensitive but 
unclassified information would be reintroduced as a regulatory requirement for DoD contractors.  
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In the meantime, there is significant risk to sensitive but unclassified information in DoD 
contractor networks. While a DoD program may have a classified component, most program 
information is unclassified, for example: contract details, procurement information, engineering 
schedules, unclassified designs, manufacturing schedules, software development, persons with 
clearance working on the program, etc are typically unclassified. A DoD contractors unclassified 
network contains terabytes upon terabytes of sensitive and valuable DoD information and 
intellectual property. 
This creates a paradoxical situation: The DoD wants to buy a complex widget so they put 
the complex widget out for bid to its contractors. DoD contractors compete with one another to 
supply the government with the complex widget at the lowest price, while still making a profit. The 
DoD contractor with the lowest price that meets specifications usually wins. But cyber security 
always adds up-front costs in terms of cyber security staff and tools. Costs are also added in 
terms of efficiency of business operations. For example, prohibiting local admin control of a 
regular user results in the user going through IT to make changes to their computer. This slows 
down the user and adds personnel needed to accomplish a task. DoD contractors must keep 
costs down and efficiencies up to win DoD contracts. This paradox is increasingly applicable as 
you go further down the scale of DoD contractor size. At the end of the day, a DoD contractor 
may not be motivated safeguard sensitive but unclassified information without regulatory 
requirements.  
Motivations for Adversaries Targeting DoD Contractors 
Since the Gulf War in 1991, the People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA) has been 
undergoing a multi-decade effort to modernize its military to catch up to the United States. [12]  
As part of its modernization strategy, the PLA has systematically accessed sensitive unclassified 
data of other governments and defense companies including those in the U.S., as a strategic 
method to shortcut years of research and development.  
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Other countries, for example Russia, Iran and North Korea have also been active cyber 
attackers of U.S. networks. The motives for hacking are continually evolving. Russian hacking 
has been motivated by strategic intelligence gathering. Iran and North Korean has been hacking 
for the purpose of symbolic destruction towards enhancing the status of their political ideologies.  
Example of U.S. Military Technology Being Hacked 
In the context of superpower competition, China is unique due to the size and power of its 
economy.  China is now the largest economy in the world when ranked by purchasing power 
parity. [13] Although many countries may have the offensive cyber capability to steal designs for 
a F-35B Joint Strike Fighter, China is the only rival with the economic resources to make their 
own copy.  
What has taken years of research, development and defense spending for the US to 
maintain a strategic defensive advantage has unfortunately not resulted in a proportionately 
dominate position for the United States.  More than any other adversary, China got the wake-up 
call in 1991, and began leveraging network vulnerabilities of DoD defense contractors, along with 
their rapidly growing economic power, China has significantly closed the gap with the US. [14]  
Figure 2: Examples of Chinese Copies of F-35 and X-47B 
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 It took Lockheed Martin nine years from the time it began developing the F-35 until the 
first production version was completed in 2006. [16] China hacked Lockheed Martin in 2009 and 
stole a huge amount of design and electronics data on the F-35. [17] The maiden flight for the 
Chinese knockoff J-31 took place in 2012, just three years later. [17]   
Sensitive but Unclassified Rephrased as Controlled 
Unclassified Information 
 
On November 4th, 2010, President Obama signed Executive Order 13556 mandating a 
Government-wide uniform program to identify and protect sensitive but unclassified information. 
EO 13556 was intended to align agency specific policies, procedures and markings for 
safeguarding and control. The executive order established a program for managing sensitive but 
unclassified information, and established a new reference term called Controlled Unclassified 
Information (CUI), replacing the term Sensitive but Unclassified. CUI categories and 
subcategories would serve as exclusive designations for identifying unclassified information 
throughout the executive branch that required safeguarding and dissemination controls.   
EO 13556 established that the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) 
would serve as the Executive Agent to implement the executive order and oversee agency actions 
to ensure compliance. The principal set of rules and regulations issued by federal agencies 
regarding national defense fall under Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 32 CFR 2002, 
established the following authorities over CUI: “As the Federal Government's Executive Agent 
(EA) for Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA), through its Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), oversees the 
Federal Government-wide CUI Program. As part of that responsibility, ISOO is issuing this rule to 
establish policy for agencies on designating, safeguarding, disseminating, marking, decontrolling, 
and disposing of CUI, self-inspection and oversight requirements, and other facets of the 
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Program. The rule affects Federal executive branch agencies that handle CUI and all 
organizations (sources) that handle, possess, use, share, or receive CUI—or which operate, use, 
or have access to Federal information and information systems on behalf of an agency.” [25] 
 The National Archives created 23 categories for CUI, which are shown in the table below: 
 
Figure 3: National Archives Categories of Controlled Unclassified Information 
Controlled Technical Information 
The Controlled Technical Information (CTI) category is the key that connects DoD 
contractor’s unclassified networks to Executive Order 13556 and is broad category that will 
potentially impact all contractors (Note that DoD contractors are also concerned with Export 
Control and Nuclear categories, but safeguarding rules for these existed for before the EO 13556, 
and only impact a small percentage of contractors).   
According to National Archives CUI Registry (CUI Registry), CTI has the 
following characteristics: 
Controlled Technical Information means technical information with military or space application that is subject to 
controls on the access, use, reproduction, modification, performance, display, release, disclosure, or 
dissemination. 
"Technical Information" means technical data or computer software, as those terms are defined in Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement clause 252.227-7013, "Rights in Technical Data - Noncommercial 
Items" (U.S. Government Publishing Office: Electronic Code of Federal Regulations). 
Examples of technical information include research and engineering data, engineering drawings, and associated 
lists, specifications, standards, process sheets, manuals, technical reports, technical orders, catalog-item 
Agriculture Intelligence Procurement and Acquisition
Critical Infrastructure International Agreements Proprietary Business Information
Emergency Management Law Enforcement SAFTEY Act Information
Export Control Legal Statistical
Financial  NATO Tax
Geoditic Nuclear Transportation
Immigration Patent Controlled Technical Information
Information Systems Vulnerability Privacy
National Archives Categories of Controlled Unclassified Information
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identifications, data sets, studies and analyses and related information, and computer software executable code 
and source code.    
Controlled technical information is to be marked with one of the distribution statements B through F, in accordance 
with Department of Defense Instruction 5230.24 "Distribution Statements of Technical Documents" (DTIC: 
Distribution Statements & Their Corresponding Reasons for Use) 
The term does not include information that is lawfully publicly available without restrictions.  
 Figure 4: Definition of Controlled Technical Information 
Not all data on a DoD contractor unclassified networks would be classified as CTI. Some 
examples include financial data, human resource data, internal governance, sales data, holiday 
party pictures, co-mingled personal use data, and so forth. In fact, less than 10% of all data at 
rest in a DoD unclassified network would be considered controlled technical information. The 
challenge for most contractors will be to identify their CTI, which is essentially all technical 
information relevant to the design, development and manufacturing of DoD contract products 
because CTI and non-CTI are co-mingled in email, on file shares and in data bases.  
The DFARS 252.204-7012 Clause 
The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) is a part of the 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP).  The DFARS is the Department of Defense 
(DoD) extension to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). “The DFARS contains requirements 
of law, DoD-wide policies, delegations of FAR authorities, deviations from FAR requirements, and 
policies/procedures that have significant impact to the public.” [17] To put it simply, DFARS is the 
method that the DoD uses to procure products and services from DoD contractors. 
On November 18, 2013, an initial ruling requiring released requiring minimum security 
controls for safeguarding controlled technical information on DoD contractor unclassified 
information systems was published in DFARS clause 252.204-7012. [22] This initial ruling had 
three parts as follows:  
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1. Incident Reporting: DoD contractors must report cyber security incidents 
involving the exfiltration of CUI to the DoD CIO within 72 hours of discovery. 
2. NIST SP 800-53 Partial Compliance: The DoD contractor must be in 
compliance with a subset of controls the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology special publication 800-53 (aka NIST SP 800-53). [13] 
3. Compliance in DoD Contractor Supply Chain: DoD contractors are required to 
flow down 252.204-7012 requirements to subcontractors who store, process or 
generate Controlled Technical Information as part of contract performance.  
On December 30th, 2015, the final ruling of the DFARS clause was issued. [23] The revised 
clause referred to a new NIST special publication 800-171. NIST SP 800-171 included 109 
controlled technical information safeguarding controls. DoD contractors would have to be 100% 
compliant with NIST SP 800-171. [24] The final ruling gave DoD contractors until December 31st, 
2017 to meet compliance.  
On December 6th, 2016, NIST SP 800-171 revision 1 was published. NIST SP 800-171r1 
included one significant enhancement called the System Security Plan (SSP), to bring the total 
control count to 110. More on the SSP in the next section. 
Details of the Clause 
Part 1: Incident Reporting 
A contractor must report an incident involving an exfiltration of controlled technical 
information within 72 hours of discovery to both 1) the prime contractor if applicable and in parallel 
to 2) the DoD at the following DFAR directed site: DOD Dibnet (dibnet.dod.mil). 
An interesting twist to keep in mind is that the average detection time of a cyber breach, 
per FireEye, is 146 days. [23] Further, more than 60% of the time, companies are made aware of 
breaches by an external party, often the FBI. When this is the case, it’s difficult for a contractor to 
have comprehended the full extent and cause of a cyber breach within 72 hours of discovery. 
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The DoD contractor can leverage advanced detection service like those provided by Dell 
SecureWorks [24], using their endpoint threat detection and their Counter Threat Unit. The 
combination of threat detection technology and a group of knowledgeable analysts are critical to 
early detection and incident response.  
Advanced incident detection services are expensive, and may be beyond the price range 
of the majority of our 33,000 defense contractors. But there isn’t anything in the clause that 
requires a minimum timeframe between breach and detection. The requirement is to report within 
72 hours from the time of detection. Thus, the Incident Reporting part of the DFARS 252.204-
7012 is relatively easy to fulfill.  
Part 2: NIST SP 800-171 Safeguarding Controls 
The NIST SP 800-171r1 standard contains 110 safeguarding controls that are mainly 
concerned with maintaining the confidentiality of controlled unclassified information. The standard 
is titled “Protection Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Organizations.” 
The standard aligns with “the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA), 
which requires federal agencies to identify and provide information security protections 
commensurate with the risk resulting from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification, or destruction of (i) information collected or maintained by or on behalf of an agency; 
or (ii) information systems used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency or other 
organization on behalf of an agency.” [27] FISMA is comprised of many publications, including 
the Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS-200, “Minimum Security Requirements for 
Federal Information Systems,” and NIST 800-53, “Security and Privacy Controls for Federal 
Information Systems and Organizations.” NIST SP 800-171 are derived specifically from FIPS 
200 and are a subset of NIST 800-53. [28] [13]  
NIST SP 800-171 contains only three chapters: 1) Introduction, 2) The Fundamentals, and 
3) The Requirements, a.k.a, “The 110 Controls.”  Chapter 1:  is essentially the who, what, where, 
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when and why of NIST SP 800-171. It explains the need to protect CUI, the motivation of the 
Executive Order 13556, the deficiencies that are addressed by the CUI program, the purpose and 
applicability and the target audience. Chapter 2: Describes the assumptions and methodology for 
developing requirement for safeguarding controlled technical information. Chapter 2 describes 
how the controls in Chapter 3 are categorized by type (basic and derived) and family (control 
groups). The control families are taken directly from FIPS-200. The basic and derived controls 
are taken directly from NIST SP 800-53. Mappings from NIST SP 800-171 to NIST SP 800-53 are 
provided in Appendix D of NIST SP 800-171.   
Basic controls establish and enforces the following where CTI is stored or processed:   
 Establishing and maintain baselines and inventories throughout system lifecycles  
 Enforcing baselines in all relevant systems (where CTI is stored or processed) 
  
Derived controls ensure the following where CTI is stored or processed: 
 Ensure change management controls  
 Ensure that changes for security impact are analyzed before changes are made  
 Ensure physical and logical access restrictions associated with changes  
 Employ the principle of least functionality in configuration and changes 
 Ensure restriction of nonessential programs, functions, ports, protocols and 
services  
 Ensure deliberate control of approved software and ensures blacklisting of 
unauthorized software 
 Ensure the monitoring and control of user installed software  
 
Basic and Derived controls are applied to the fourteen FIPS-200 control families.  There 
are 30 basic controls and 79 derived controls comprising the 110 controls.  
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The 110th control is the System Security Plan (SSP). As mentioned earlier in the report, 
the SSP was not a part of the original version of 800-171, but was added in Revision 1 published 
in December of 2016.  
The ultimate purpose of the SSP is to demonstrate to relevant federal agencies and prime 
contractors the implementation or planned implementation of the security requirements of DFARS 
252.204.7012 in NIST SP 800-171.  As stated in NIST SP 800-171:  
“Federal agencies may consider the submitted system security plans and plans 
of action as critical inputs to an overall risk management decision to process, 
store, or transmit CUI on a system hosted by a nonfederal organization and 
whether or not it is advisable to pursue an agreement or contract with the non-
federal organization.” [22]  
To translate “the ultimate purpose” above in a different way, “planned implementation of 
security requirements” means that 100% of the safeguarding controls are not required to be in 
place before December 31st, 2017 as long as the contractor has a plan of action to become 
compliant and the contracting officer agrees with the SSP’s mitigations. A contracting officer at 
the DoD or a prime contractor is empowered to accept a SSP as documentation of compliance, 
even if the DoD contractor doesn’t comply with all 110 safeguarding controls.  
It’s important to note that some of the controls in 800-171 are expensive to implement. For 
example, control 3.13.8 requires that CTI be encrypted at rest. This can be a very costly to 
implement in the data center, where storage area networks are typically not encrypted at the drive 
Control Family Basic  Derived Control Family Basic  Derived
Access Control 2 20 Media Protection 3 6
Awareness and Training 2 1 Personnel Security 2 0
Audit and Accountability 2 7 Physical Protection 2 4
Configuration Management 2 7 Risk Assessment 1 2
Identification and Authentication 2 9 Security Assessment 4 0
Incident Response 2 1 System and Communications Protection 2 14
Maintenance 2 4 System and Information Integrity 3 4
Safeguarding Controls by Control Group in NIST SP 800‐171
Figure 5: Safeguarding Controls by Control Group and Type 
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level.  However, companies tend to continually refresh and updating the IT infrastructures. An 
SSP can be leveraged to align IT infrastructure upgrade plans within the SSP plans of action.   
The SSP can also be a strategic document for a DoD contractor to use as an IT risk 
management framework. DFARS compliance requirements and gaps can be communicated to 
contractor employees through the SSP, or by using the SSP as a baseline reference. The 
contractor accomplished two objectives 1) Enlisting the organization in the coordination of 
continuous improvement in risk posture and to closing compliance weaknesses, and 2) 
Reinforcing employee awareness, satisfying requirements in the “Awareness and Training” 
control family.  The “NIST SP 800-171 System Security Plan” should be comprehensively updated 
annually, at a minimum, as part of compliance with DFARS 252.204-7012.” A well written SSP, 
including a solid safeguarding controls strategy and reasonable plans of action to close 
compliance gaps is the key to DFARS compliance.  
Part 3: Compliance Oversight of DoD Contractor Supply Chain  
Within the DoD contractor ecosystem, there are prime contractors and subcontractors. 
Prime contractors are the DoD contractor who is awarded the contract from the DoD.  Sub-
contractors are contracted by prime contractors to facilitate contract delivery. For example, 
Northrop Grumman wins a contract to build an aircraft carrier, the subcontract thousands of 
subsystems to build the carrier, like the nuclear propulsion system, the electrical system, the 
aircraft control system, etc.   
The third part of DFARS compliance requires that DoD contractors are also responsible 
for ensuring and monitoring the DFARS compliance of any subcontractor in their supply chain 
where CTI is exchanged as part of contact fulfillment. Unfortunately, this isn’t an efficient way to 
thoroughly accomplish this part, and can only be accomplished through best effort. With a DoD 
ecosystem of more than 33,000 contractors, and each contractor a continually improving and 
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evolving path towards DFARS compliance, ensuring and monitoring compliance is a monumental 
requirement.  
This is further complicated by the fact that since the DoD did not include an auditing or 
certification mechanism as part of DFARS 252.204-7012 compliance. DoD contractors will not (at 
the time of this writing) have an independent third party assess compliance, and provide a 
certification that can be used to prove compliance to contracting officers. 
“No new oversight paradigm is created through this rule. If oversight related to 
these requirements is deemed necessary, then it can be accomplished through 
existing Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and DFARS allowances, or an 
additional requirement can be added to the terms of the contract. The rule does 
not require “certification” of any kind. By signing the contract, the contractor 
agrees to comply with the contract's terms.” [29] 
 DFARS compliance relies on the DoD contractor’s self-attestation, and compliance is a 
moving target. To make this even harder, assessing a subcontractors System Security Plan (or 
cyber questionnaire in use now by some prime contractors) can only be interpreted by an 
experienced cyber security professional. Cyber security professionals are in limited supply in most 
DoD contractors, and they’re busy closing the gaps on their own company’s compliance situation.  
Figure 6: The Exostar Subcontractor Assessment Platform 
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As all DoD contractors are busy closing the gaps on compliance, their compliance assessments 
change, questionnaires need to be updated, and the assessors need to re-review.  
There is also risk associated with contractors haphazardly assessing each other without 
a secure collaboration platform, since implementation of safeguarding controls, can provide 
vulnerability information to be exploited if they fell in the wrong hands. Vulnerabilities are only 
exploited wen they are discovered. Consequently, the exchange of assessment information 
increases the likelihood that a vulnerability will be discovered by a threat actor. 
There is at least one company that provides a robust and secure platform for monitoring 
compliance of the supply chain. The company, called Exostar [25], allows DoD contractors to 
complete a DFARS cyber security questionnaire one time, and then connect the results of the 
questionnaire to prime contractors who are doing the oversight.  The benefit to the DoD contractor 
is they can manage their compliance reporting in one place, as long as their prime contractors 
are using the platform (most of the major DoD prime contractors are). Then, for prime contractors, 
the Exostar platform allows contracting officer (or cyber professional) to view compliance reporting 
in an efficient manner.  
Intended Outcome of the DFARS Clause 
The DFARS clause has created a CTI safeguarding expectation within the DoD contractor 
community, and between DoD contractors and the DoD. Timely reporting of breaches of CTI can 
be disseminated to the DoD as well as to other DoD contractors, helping all to prepare for and to 
identify the unique indicators of compromise of the threat actors. While a significantly motivated 
threat actor is difficult to stop, safeguarding controls and information sharing will slow down a 
threat actor, and threat actor offensive operations will be more expensive. As NIST SP 800-171 
bakes into all DoD contractor business operations, cyber security performance will continually 
improve.  
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Figure 7: Cyber Security in Military Industrial Complex After 12/31/2017 
 
But the U.S. taxpayer/citizen is the greatest beneficiary to continually improving cyber 
security in the MIC. With continually improving cyber security, defense spending investments are 
better protected. The U.S. strategic defensive advantage will widen in proportion to the U.S. 
dominance in spending. Most importantly, the U.S. taxpayer/citizen will be more assured that 
national security is not weakened by poor cyber security in the MIC.  
DoD Contractor Benefits 
Although DoD contractors realize it is in their best interest to have a robust information 
assurance program, they have been limited in executing comprehensive cyber programs due to 
the supplemental costs and the competitive nature of winning contracts. But the new DFARS 
regulation levels the playing field where all contractors must now invest in the supplemental costs 
of implementing the controls in NIST SP 800-171.  
The larger DoD contractors have historically had more at stake against cyber threats. Big 
high-profile contractors like Lockheed Martin and Boeing are have mature cyber programs, as the 
DoD has held them to individual standards as part of winning multi-billion dollar contracts.   
However, the bottom 99% of DoD contractors have had little financial incentive to apply 
robust cyber security programs in their companies. Cyber security cost money and impacts 
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business operations.  Smaller DoD contractors must be very competitive to win contracts. With 
the DFARS clause, DoD contractors have a new differentiator to leverage a strategic advantage. 
DoD contractors who can efficiently execute DFARS compliance will leverage a strategic 
advantage.   
Unintended Outcome of the DFARS Clause 
As of the time of this writing, most of the 33,000 companies who sell to the DoD have little 
grasp for how DFARS 252.204-7012 connects to NIST SP 800-171, and how that is a subset of 
NIST SP 800-53, and how that is an outcome of FIPS-200, and how that is an outcome of FISMA, 
and that 800-171 is a response to Executive Order 13556 to ensure protection of controlled 
unclassified information, and that executive order assigned the National Archives as the 
administrative agency, who defines the properties of the controlled unclassified information that 
contractors are accountable to protect through the safeguards in 800-171.  To be sure, DFARS 
compliance is complicated and highly technical. Most of the 33,000 companies selling to the DoD 
have fewer than 100 employees, and/or are companies whose main business is not DoD 
contracts, and consequently do not have staff expertise capable of managing DFARS compliance.  
The DoD did not intend for the DFARS clause to create a new market opportunity to be 
exploited by private industry. The DoD foresaw that contractors would use the ramp up time to 
the DFARS compliance deadline to efficiently adopt the controls in NIST SP 800-171. But 
because of the DFARS challenge to contractors, private industry is swooping in with solutions to 
help become compliant and sustain compliance. 
To watch the market evolve and grown for DFARS solutions providers, a Twitter hashtag 
search of #DFARS shows companies entering the DFARS solutions market every week. A few 
examples with summary offerings include the following:  
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Sera Brynn - “The New DFARS COMPLIANCE 252.204-7012 and you, the U.S. 
Government Contractor - We help your business achieve compliance through our DFARS Part 
252.204-7012 Compliance and Assessment Services.” [28] 
Trustifier – DFARS Compliance-Kit – Make your business DFARS compliant by the 15th 
of May at a fraction of the cost of a DIY home-grown compliance solution. [29] 
Coalfire – “DFARS/NIST 800-171 Simplifying Compliance through Automation - Join AWS 
and Coalfire for this free webinar on managing DFARS 252.204-7012 and NIST 800-171 
compliance hosted on AWS, managed with Splunk and delivered by Coalfire” [30] 
I2Act – “Reach Your Cyber Summit – All DoD Contractor and Subcontractors are required 
to be in compliance with DFARS 252.204-7012 by December 31st, 2017 and must complete a 
cyber assessment, present a remediation plan and status of compliance and provide a POA&M” 
[31]    
And, as mentioned in “Part 3: Compliance Oversight in the DoD Supply Chain,” the 
Exostar platform helps contractors manage DFARS compliance in the supply chain.  
Risks to the DFARS Clause 
As of December 31st, 2017, all 33,000 DoD contractors are expected to be in compliance 
with DFARS 252.204-7012 if the clause was written into a contract the contractor was awarded. 
If the contractor was awarded the contract as early as 2015, it’s likely the clause was in the 
contract. But the DoD has no mechanism in place for measuring evolving state of compliance for 
DoD contractors. Many DoD contractors are accepting awarded contracts with the clause, and 
choosing to worry about compliance later. Further, as discussed earlier, the compliance process 
does not include a certified third party audit. Instead the compliance process relies on the honor 
system, which is called “self-attestation.” The DoD will not know for certain whether DoD 
contractors are running robust compliance programs. Gaps in a contractor’s compliance program 
will be revealed if and when the contractor reports a breach of CUI/CTI, and if the breach is bad 
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enough to warrant an investigation. With DFARS compliance complexity, scope, costs, behavioral 
changes, and lack of expertise, the conditions for significant industry-wide compliance gaps are 
high.  
Specific Risk to the DoD  
The DoD will become increasingly aware of industry-wide compliance gaps in the weeks 
and months following the compliance deadline. Thus, there will be a gradual realization that the 
overwhelming numbers of links in the supply chain are non-compliant. The DoD will not be able 
to shut down the supply chain, yet the law requires compliance with the DFARS clause. How the 
DoD will navigate through this likelihood is uncertain.   
Specific Risk to the DoD Contractor 
Aside from the fact that the contractor stands to lose DoD contracts for non-compliance, 
there is the penalty for misrepresenting DFARS compliance. The penalty for a breach of 
obligations is as follows: “(i) Criminal, civil, administrative, and contractual actions in law and 
equity for penalties, damages, and other appropriate remedies by the United States; and (ii) Civil 
actions for damages and other appropriate remedies by the third party that reported the cyber 
incident, as a third party beneficiary of this clause.” [32] 
Compliance Strategies 
The DoD Defense Industrial Base partnership [33] categorizes DoD contractors as small, 
medium and large. The categorization provides a simple reference to the number of employees 
working for the defense contractor, since the number of employees is a reasonable indicator of 
the contractor’s IT and Cyber capability. Large contractors have greater than 10,000 employees, 
medium contractors have between 1000-10,000 employees, and small contractors have less than 
1000 employees.  
 
 25 
 
 
Figure 8: Scope of DoD Contractors Categorized by Number of Employees 
 
Of the $300 billion in defense contracts awarded in 2015, $135 billion were awarded to 
large defense contractors, comprising the top 30, with medium sized contractors comprising 31 – 
100, totaling $40 billion more in contracts. [5] With the total scope of DoD contractors in 2015 
estimated to be 33,000, the remaining $125 billion in contracts were awarded to 32,900 
contractors.  It’s impossible to be exacting in identifying the dividing line is between large, medium 
and small, since DoD contracts awards are not proportional to the number of employees in 
companies. The size of contract award is simply being used as a barometer to identify number 
scope of the number of companies in each category, and the compliance strategy they can 
consider using. The graphic at right shows a reasonable estimate for number of DoD contractors 
in each category.   
Small DoD Contractor Compliance Strategy 
Small contractors often lack the technical or compliance staff needed to comprehend the 
safeguarding requirements in DFARS.  In addition, small contractors are typically subcontractors 
to the medium and large contractors (bigger contractors), although they also win contracts directly 
from DoD.  The pressure to comply to DFARS will be from the large and medium contractors. 
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However, that pressure is a long way from critical mass.  The bigger contractors are still focusing 
on their own compliance gaps. It will take a year or two from the compliance deadline of December 
31st, 2017 for the bigger contractors to mature their DFARS compliance efficiencies such that they 
can enhance focus on the small contractors. In the meantime, the majority of small contractors 
are largely unaware or are underestimating the safeguarding compliance at hand. 
Yet, as time progresses, the industries “tribal knowledge” will evolve in developing smart 
and efficient compliance strategies that can be applied in a small contractor environment. The 
tribal knowledge available now is already being productized and sold by companies like the ones 
mentioned in “Unintended Outcome” section above.  
In terms of DFARS compliance, the advantage for small DoD contractors is that they 
typically have information infrastructures that are far less complex than the bigger contractors. 
Remember that DFARS only requires safeguarding of controlled technical information (CUI/CTI). 
A smaller contractor can more easily isolate their CTI to a small group of computers within their 
infrastructure, and define this as the security boundary where safeguarding controls are applied. 
Working with a smaller information infrastructure, and a finite data footprint, a subject matter 
expert could shorten the NIST SP 800-171 learning curve and help a small company to 
compliance within days or weeks, depending on the starting point compliance gap.  
Medium DoD Contractor Compliance Strategy 
Medium contractors have the greatest challenge in terms of DFARS compliance. There 
are several characteristics about medium contractors that, taken together, make DFARS 
particularly challenging. 
 Information assurance programs that are less mature than large contractors. 
 Diverse information infrastructures that can span across the US (sometimes 
international). 
 Organically grown information infrastructures (often through mergers and 
acquisitions) that are weak in central governance 
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 Data sprawl across the information infrastructure, making CUI/CTI difficult to 
identify and manage. 
 Boundaries of acceptable use corporate culture leans towards permissive and 
risky. 
 Executive leadership focus to minimize overhead costs, prioritizes IT capability 
over IT risk reductions 
These characteristics are always applicable, but obviously in varying degrees. Medium 
contractors often compete with large contractors or with other medium contractors, and price 
being the main differentiator.  Keeping costs down, especially overhead costs, allows medium 
contractors to win and grow. This is why medium contractors have less mature information 
assurance programs than larger contractors, who can spread overhead costs among thousands 
more employees. Thus, the typical medium contractor has bigger compliance gaps to close than 
the typical large contractor. 
By now, every medium contractor has identified the staff member accountable to DFARS 
compliance. The Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) is where accountability falls by default 
according to FISMA. But many medium contractors have yet to fill the CISO role, in which case 
the accountability will be assigned to the CIO or the organizational lead for government 
compliance. Whoever the accountable person is, its highly likely they have not figured out how to 
close all the gaps before the compliance deadline.  
The key to closing the compliance gap for medium contractors is the 800-171 System 
Security Plan (SSP), described in “Part 2: NIST SP 800-171 Safeguarding Controls.” A well written 
SSP, with reasonable plans of action for closing compliance gaps (even beyond the compliance 
deadline) provides the strategic framework for the medium contractor. Medium contractors should 
leverage the SSP as the strategic document that aligns expectations of the organization with the 
prime contractor of DoD.  
  Medium contractors facing the DFARS compliance challenge should also comprehend 
the unique advantages they have compared to large contractors. For example, a CISO (or the 
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staff member accountable for DFARS compliance) driving compliance in a medium contractor 
organization can usually leverage a higher degree of agility than a large contractor. In addition, 
CISO’s who’ve historically fought for priority of information security versus capability can leverage 
DFARS compliance to increase priority. 
Large DoD Contractor Compliance Strategy 
Large contractors are different from small and medium contractors because they already 
have mature information assurance programs. The cyber security spotlight has been on large 
DoD contractors at least since the Chinese hacked Lockheed Martin in 2009 and stole a huge 
amount of design and electronics data on the F-35. [17]  
In lieu of the mandatory standard that is NIST SP 800-171, the DoD has been pushing the 
larger contractors articulate information assurance programs as part of the winning the largest 
contracts. The DoD has used NIST SP 800-53 as the benchmark to compare information 
assurance programs large contractors. Thus, the mature information assurance programs in place 
at the large contractors are based on 800-53, which is the super set of safeguarding controls in 
800-171.  
Nevertheless, this does not mean the large contractors are 100% compliant with 800-171. 
It simply means that their compliance gaps are much smaller. Instead of wrestling with compliance 
of 60% of the 109 safeguarding controls as a small contractor would be, or 30% of the 
safeguarding controls as a medium contractor would be, the large contractor is wrestling with 
compliance on less than 5% of the safeguarding controls of 800-171. In almost all cases, the large 
contractor is struggling with multi-factor authentication safeguards, encryption at rest safeguards, 
and encryption in transit safeguards. In all cases, these safeguards have been applied to parts of 
their information infrastructure, but not yet reaching 100%.  
The compliance strategy for the large contractor is simple: Write an SSP that describes 
the plan of action for closing the gaps on the specific safeguarding controls.  
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The Future of DoD Cybersecurity Compliance 
On February 12, 2015, President Obama signed Executive Order 13691 promoting cyber 
security information sharing between and among private industry and the government. [34] From 
a DFARS compliance standpoint, this is somewhat an extension of the part requiring incident 
reporting within 72 hours of incident detection. DFARS compliance is a critical milestone for all 
DoD contractors, especially the medium and small contractors who will develop information 
assurance programs as an outcome. But the 109 safeguarding controls that comprise 800-171 
are obstructions to threat actors, they won’t stop the threat actors from being successful. “Great 
Wall defenses could be leapt over or maneuvered around. Instead, cyber security teams, civilian 
and military, should focus on detection and resilience – designing systems that could spot an 
attack early on and repair the damage swiftly.” [12] Information sharing is the key to detection, 
and automation is the key sharing information quickly.  
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The Defense Security Information Exchange is a non-profit organization formed with a 
mission of sharing information about threat actors within the DoD contractor community. [35] 
Since the nation-state threat actor groups who target DoD contractors use the same tactics, 
techniques and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) no matter who they are 
hacking, the DSIE was formed to share the TTPs and IOCs amongst the community. This 
collaboration is extremely effective in improving detection and improving countermeasures 
against the worlds most skilled hackers.  
The next level of sophistication for DoD contractors to improve detection and resilience is 
to automate where possible. There are many platforms available to achieve TTP and IOC 
automation, for example the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP). [36]  
DoD contractor information sharing collaboration is a powerful countermeasure against 
nation-state threat actors. The earlier TTPs and IOCs are identified, the costlier offensive 
operations become, with each attack requiring a new strategy. However, there are some in the 
Figure 9: Contractor Threat Information Sharing of the Near Future 
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DoD contractor community who think that information sharing is a two-way street, meaning that 
they are willing to share TTPs and IOCs to other contractors who will also provide reciprocal TTPs 
and IOCs. This is not surprising considering DoD contractors are often competing for contracts, 
so why give valuable information away to a potential competitor. Others see the information 
sharing among DoD contactors as an issue of national security, so let the contractors compete 
for contracts, but the cyber community should work together regardless.  
Executive Order 13631 recognizes that information sharing is in the best interest of the 
United States. This is already being proven within the DoD contractor community through the 
DSIE. Information sharing trends will continue to improve. At some point in coming years,  DFARS 
clause will evolve to add information sharing as a part of compliance.  
Conclusion 
The U.S. Federal Government spends more than 50% of the discretionary budget on 
defense, and 75% of the military budget is spent with DoD contractors. On December 31st, 2017, 
DoD contractors will, for the first time, be required by law to protect controlled technical information 
in their unclassified networks. Controlled technical information has been targeted and exfiltrated 
by nation state threat actors for several years, for the purpose of replicating U.S. defensive 
capabilities. Nation-state threat actors will continue to steal U.S. technology, so DoD contractors 
must be held to minimum safeguarding standards. The For as much as the U.S. prioritizes in 
defense spending, the American taxpayer should expect that we adequately protect the U.S 
military intellectual property from espionage. It is the duty, and now the law, for all DoD contractors 
meet and exceed the DFARS clause. 
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